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I. INTRODUCTION
Our tax system continues to lose revenue through a tax eva-
sion device known as the "mail-order ministry." The device has
proliferated over the years and now presents a major problem to
the integrity of our revenue raising system. In attempting to chal-
lenge the tax-exempt status of a mail-order ministry, the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") and the courts have had to deal with
troublesome constitutional restrictions which arise in connection
with the charitable contribution rules of section 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code ("Code") and the religious purpose exemption of
section 501(c)(3) of the Code.
The IRS refers to a mail-order ministry as a "tax protester
scheme" in which numerous groups sell church charters and minis-
ter's credentials as part of a program which is designed to decrease
a person's income taxes.' A typical plan involves promoters selling
certificates of "ordination" through the mail, in exchange for a do-
nation.2 Once ordained, the minister can establish an organization
which can claim to be a church or other religious institution.3 Typ-
ically, a mail-order minister earns his or her living as something
other than a minister.
1. Internal Revenue Service Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue
Manual Supplement. 9 G-93, January 10, 1979, at 16. [hereinafter cited as Manual
Supplement].
2. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,247 (1977).
3. Examination Procedures, 4 Internal Revenue Manual (CCH) Paragraph
7(10)75.1 (Mar. 17, 1988). Exempt Organization Handbook, 4 Internal Revenue
Manual (CCH) Paragraph 344.7 (May 18, 1988).
[Vol. 11:1
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In general, a mail-order minister can avoid taxation by two
methods." First, section 170 allows an individual, itemizing tax-
payer to deduct a contribution to a church in an amount which
does not exceed fifty percent of such individual's adjusted gross
income.' The church, in turn, provides the person with a home and
living expenses.' The second method requires the individual to
take a "vow of poverty" and assign his or her assets and income
derived from present employment to a church. 7 The assigned in-
come then provides for his or her living expenses.' Typically, both
plans are used together to cause tax avoidance. Thus, through ei-
ther alternative, a mail-order minister is able to claim a tax-free
return of a substantial portion of such individual's outside business
income.'
This article will concern the "section 170 deduction method"
of establishing a mail-order ministry. 10 Part II examines the consti-
tutional restraints that present problems to the IRS and the courts
when they attempt to challenge this tax avoidance scheme. Part III
sets forth the problems that the IRS and the courts face with mail-
order ministry schemes. Part IV discusses the section 170 deduc-
4. A method of avoiding taxes through the utilization of a mail-order minis-
try, which is not often utilized, requires that the mail-order ministry receive a tax
exemption by claiming that income earned by assets held in its name is not sub-
ject to tax. See Note, "I Know it When I See it": Mail-order Ministry Tax Fraud
and the Problem of a Constitutionally Acceptable Definition of Religion, 25
AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 113 (1987) [hereinafter cited as Tax Fraud].
5. For itemizing taxpayers, contributions made to a "church or a convention
or association of churches and to other publicly supported religious institutions
qualify for deductions in an amount which is not in excess of 50 percent of the
taxpayer's contribution base for a taxable year." I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (1988).
6. Exempt Organizations Handbook, 4 Internal Revenue Manual (CCH)
Paragraph 334.7 (May 18, 1988); I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (1988).
7. Id. (A salary paid for the services of a religious order member are attribu-
table to the order's income, not to the member's income). Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2
C.B. 26 (1977).
8. Examination Procedures, 4 Internal Revenue Manual (CCH) Paragraph
7(10)75.1 (Mar. 17, 1988).
9. Comment, Mail Order Ministries: Application of the Religious Purpose
Exemption Under the First Amendment, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 895, 912-13
(1984) [hereinafter cited as The Religious Purpose Exemption Under the First
Amendment].
10. For discussions of the vow of poverty method of establishing a mail-order
ministry See The Religious Purpose Exemption Under the First Amendment,
supra note 9; Comment, Mail Order Ministries, The Religious Purpose Exemp-
tion and the Constitution, 33 No. 3 TAX LAW 959 (1980) [hereinafter cited as The
Religious Purpose Exemption and the Constitution].
19881
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tion method. Finally, Part V provides a summary and conclusion
of the article.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS
The first amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ."
This quote sets forth what are known as the "establishment" and
"free exercise" clauses. The religious clauses generally have three
goals: first, to insure that any religious participation is voluntary;
second, to keep state and religious affairs separate from each other;
and third, to prevent the state from preferring one religion over
another and from discriminating between one religion over another
and from discriminating between religion and non-religion. 2 These
clauses set out the relationship between religion and government
by imposing restrictions on the government and the courts when
challenging the validity of mail-order ministry schemes.
A. The Establishment Clause
The establishment clause prohibits two things: first, govern-
ment sponsorship of religion by mandating that government
neither formally establish nor aid a religion; and second, a prefer-
ence for religion over non-religion.' 3 The clause applies to both
federal and local government. 14
The Supreme Court has set the boundaries of allowable gov-
ernmental support for activities conducted by churches. The Court
gradually developed a test which appeared in final form in Lemon
v. Kurtzman.16 Under the Lemon test, a government act must have
a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect which neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion; and it must not have the effect of fos-
tering excessive governmental entanglement in religion. 6 Despite
the Lemon test, the government may aid all people in a religiously
neutral manner for secular purposes even though there is also some
11. U.S. Const. amend. I.
12. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1684
(1969).
13. J. NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1030 (2d ed. 1983).
14. Id.
15. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
16. Id. at 612-613. (citing Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243
(1968); Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
[Vol. 11:1
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incidental aid to religious institutions.17
B. The Free Exercise Clause
The free exercise clause forbids governmental interference
with the right of religious belief. 18 The Supreme Court has tradi-
tionally recognized that the clause absolutely forbids government
interference with religious beliefs.19
The important boundaries of the free exercise clause are set
forth in three Supreme Court cases: Braunfeld v. Brown,2 0 Sher-
bert v. Verner,2I and Wisconsin v. Yoder.2 In Braunfeld, the Su-
preme Court held that a Pennsylvania statute, which limited busi-
ness activity on Sunday, could constitutionally be applied to
Orthodox Jews whose beliefs required them to observe another day
as the Sabbath.23 The Supreme Court decided that even where the
effect and purpose of a state statute is secular, if an individual bur-
den on religion occurs, the law must be struck if the state can "ac-
complish its purpose by means which do not impose such a bur-
den. 1 24 The Court stated that the free exercise clause does not
forbid an incidental burden on the free exercise of religion, but,
the government must show there are no less-restrictive alternative
forms of regulation.25
In Sherbert, the Supreme Court held that state unemploy-
ment benefits could not be refused to a Seventh Day Adventist be-
cause she would not work on Saturday due to her religious convic-
tions. 26 The majority stated that for the refusal of benefits to
withstand a free exercise challenge, "it must be either because her
disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the
state of her constitutional right of free exercise, or because an inci-
dental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be
17. See supra note 13 at 1031.
18. See supra note 9 at 898.
19. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Torcaso v. Watkins,
397 U.S. 488, 492 (1961). (citing Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1946)).
20. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
21. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
22. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
23. 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961).
24. Id. at 607.
25. Id.
26. 374 U.S. 398.
19881
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justified by a compelling state interest in the regulation .... ",7
This statement implies that the burden on the exercise of one's
religion is to be balanced against the state interest at issue and the
degree in which the state interest would be undermined by ac-
comodating the religious exercise.28
Finally, in Yoder, the Supreme Court held that Wisconsin
could not compel members of the Amish church to send their chil-
dren to public school beyond the eighth grade.2 9 The Supreme
Court stated that in order for the state to succeed against a free
exercise claim, "it must appear either that the state does not deny
the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there
is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest
claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause."3 Thus, the
Supreme Court followed Sherbert and Braunfeld because they re-
quire the state interest at issue to be balanced against the interest
of the individual to freely practice his or her religion.
C. Religion and the Internal Revenue Laws
A constitutional issue which arises in mail-order ministry cases
is whether the "church" is "organized" and "operated" for a reli-
gious purpose.31 Under section 170, a charitable contribution
27. Id. at 403. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
28. See supra note 13, at 1058-59.
29. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 at 234.
30. Id. at 214.
31. For administrative purposes, the Internal Revenue Manual sets forth the
following criteria with respect to whether a religious organization may qualify as a
"church" under section 5 §§ 170(b)(1)(a)(i), 508(c)(1)(A), or 6033(a)(2)(A) of the
Code:
(1) A distinct legal existence;
(2) A recognized creed and form of worship;
(3) A definite and distinct ecclesiastical government;
(4) A formal code of doctrine and discipline;
(5) A distinct religious history;
(6) A membership not associated with any other church or denomination;
(7) A complete organization of ordained ministers ministering to their
congregations;
(8) Ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed course of study;
(9) A literature of its own;
(10) Established place of worship;
(11) Regular congregations;
(12) Regular religious services;
(13) Sunday schools for the religious instruction of the young;
(14) Schools for the preparation of its ministers; and
[Vol. 11:1
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means a contribution or gift for the use of a corporation, trust or
community chest, fund or foundation which is "organized" and
"operated" exclusively for a "religious purpose."32 A taxpayer must
make a charitable contribution before he or she can claim a tax
deduction. However, section 170 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder do not define how organizations are organized and op-
erated exclusively for a religious purpose. However, section
501(c)(3) provides that organizations will be exempt from taxation
if they are "organized and operated exclusively for reli-
gious . . . purposes."" Treasury Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-1
provides an explanation of how organizations are organized and
operated exclusively for a religious purpose.3 ' This regulation pro-
motes the common Congressional purpose of both section 170 and
section 501, by providing guidance for the proper interpretation of
section 170, 3" although the regulation does not specifically refer to
section 170. Thus, the rules set forth in the regulations under sec-
tion 501(c)(3) guide the courts and the IRS in claims for deduc-
tions under section 170.36
Section 1.501(c)(3)-1 does not define the term "religious pur-
pose. '3 7 In addition, the Code and Treasury regulations do not de-
fine the term "religion."38 The courts and the IRS have tried to
define the word with little success.39 Thus, the term religion, as it
is used in the "religious purpose" phrase of section 501(c)(3) and
section 170(c) of the Code is not clearly defined. In addition to the
problems incurred in defining a religious purpose under the first
amendment, the courts and the IRS cannot question the sincerity
(15) Any other facts and circumstances which may bear upon the organiza-
tion's claim for church status.
The Religious Purpose Exemption Under the First Amendment, supra note 9, at
918 n. 142.
32. I.R.C. § 170(c) (1988).
33. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988).
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a), (b) and (c), (as amended in 1976).
35. See, e.g., Calvin K. of Oakknoll v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 770 (1978),
aff'd. by Order, 603 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1979) citing Morey v. Ridell, 205 F. Supp.
918, 920 (S.D. Cal. 1962). See also, Canada v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 973 (1984).
36. Calvin, 69 T.C. at 773.
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (as amended in 1976).
38. See Procedures in 'Mail Order Ministries' Examinations, 4 Internal Reve-
nue Manual (CCH) paragraph 7(10)75.5 (Mar. 17, 1988).
39. See, e.g., The Religious Purpose Exemption under the First Amend-
ment, supra note 9.
1988]
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of one's beliefs."0 Thus, they have problems determining whether
an organization is in fact religious. As a result of this prohibition
set forth by the first amendment, a window of opportunity under
the guise of the first amendment has opened for mail-order minis-
try schemes.41 These so-called "churches" often claim that their
members follow a "sincere" belief in a religion to meet the require-
ments under sections 170 and 501(c)(3) which shield their donors
from required tax payments. Since problems exist with defining
the term religion and determining whether an organization is in
fact religious, it is difficult for the courts and the IRS to ascertain
whether an institution is organized and operated for a religious
purpose. The case of Universal Life Church v. United States,'42
demonstrates the problems that the IRS and the courts face in this
area.
III. THE PROBLEMS THAT THE IRS AND THE COURTS FACE WITH
MAIL-ORDER MINISTRY SCHEMES
In Universal Life Church, Inc. v. United States,'43 the Univer-
sal Life Church ("ULC") ordained ministers, granted church char-
ters, and issued Honorary Doctor of Divinity degrees." Requests
for the ministers' credentials and church charters were made
largely by mail. The church conferred free ministers' credentials to
anyone who requested them.4'5 At trial, the founder of the church,
Reverend Kirby J. Hensley, testified that "[t]he Universal Life
Church has no traditional doctrine. It only believes in that which is
right. We believe that everyone has a right to express it, and we
recognize everyone's belief."'46
40. U.S. Const. amend. I.
41. For example, the IRS Manual provides that an organization will be con-
sidered "religious" only if its members have a sincere and meaningful belief in
whatever doctrine is espoused, and this belief occupies in the lives of those mem-
bers a place parallel to that filled by God in the lives of traditionally religious
persons. See, e.g., The Religious Purpose Exemption under the First Amend-
ment, supra note 9. However, the Manual acknowledges that under the first
amendment, the government cannot consider the content or sources of a doctrine
which is alleged to constitute a particular religion and cannot make an attempt to
evaluate the content of whatever doctrine a particular organization is religious. Id.
42. 372 F. Supp. 770 (1974).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Although the ULC did not require a fee as a condition to the issuance of
minister's credentials, a free-will offering of twenty dollars was suggested. Id.
46. Id. at 773.
[Vol. II:I
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The government challenged the tax-exempt status of the ULC
on the ground that the organization was not operated for a reli-
gious purpose and the issuance of Honorary Doctor of Divinity de-
grees by the ULC was in violation of public policy. 47 The district
court refused to accept the position of the government stating:
Neither this court nor any branch of government will consider the
merits or fallacies of a religion. Nor will the court compare the
beliefs, dogmas and practices of a newly organized religion with
those of an older, more established religion. Were the court to do
so, it would impinge upon the guarantees of the first
amendment.48
The district court held for the ULC because holding otherwise
would require a ruling on the merits of a religion thus violating the
first amendment. 49 It is interesting to note that in an interview af-
ter the court's decision, Reverend Hensley stated that the church
was deliberately designed to exploit a church's tax-exempt status.5 0
The holding of Universal Life Church can be analogized for
section 170(c) purposes although this case was argued on section
501(c)(3) grounds. Since the IRS granted the ULC's tax exemp-
tion, ministers of the church were allowed to claim charitable con-
tribution deductions. This decision thwarted the efforts of the IRS
to terminate mail-order ministries.
The goverment has utilized other approaches to eradicate the
tax protester schemes at issue. For example, in Universal Life
Church, Inc. v. United States ("ULC II"),51 the claims court
granted summary judgment against the ULC. The case is a prime
example of how the IRS is currently challenging the tax-exempt
status of mail-order ministry schemes. In ULC II, the IRS revoked
the tax-exempt status of the ULC on grounds that the ULC was
being operated for the substantial nonexempt purpose of providing
tax advice to its ministers.52 The tax advice, concerning methods
for tax avoidance, was disseminated through articles in newsletters,
textbooks, pamphlets, oral presentations, and other materials.53
47. Id. at 775.
48. Id. at 776.
49. Id.
50. See supra note 10 at 962 n. 22 (citing "Mail Order Ministers," 60 Min-
utes, CBS Television, September 26, 1976).
51. 13 Cl. Ct. 567 (1987).
52. Id. at 568-569.
53. Id. at 570-579.
1988]
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The ministry also authorized the Church of Universal Har-
mony to recruit members for the ULC. The Church of Universal
Harmony sold charters to congregations whose members commit-
ted criminal fraud and conspiracy and who operated sex clubs, a
discotheque, a restaurant and conducted other nonexempt activi-
ties. 4 Moreover, an individual convicted of criminal tax fraud sat
on the board of directors of the ULC.5 5 Finally, the ministry en-
couraged members to write correspondence to the IRS advocating
against the disallowance of members' deductions."
The claims court agreed with the IRS, and held that the ULC
was operated for a substantial nonexempt purpose.5 ' The claims
court found that the ministry's dissemination of tax advice to its
ministers was primarily to promote the substantial nonexempt
purpose of "giving tax advice."' "s Moreover, the claims court found
that the ULC's affiliation with the Church of Universal Harmony
and the activities of its recruits further evidenced that the church
was operated for a substantial nonexempt purpose. 9
The facts in ULC II are markedly different than those found
in the district court decision of Universal Life Church, Inc. v.
United States (ULC I).'o Listed below are the pertinent facts in
ULC II which differ from ULC I:
1. In ULC II the church issued newsletters, textbooks, pam-
phlets, manuals, oral presentations and other publications which
contained tax advice aimed at avoiding taxes;
2. agents who were convicted of tax evasion provided recruits
for the ULC;
3. charter churches operated sex stores, restaurants and,
discotheques;
4. an individual convicted of criminal tax fraud sat on the
ULC board of directors;
5. members without knowledge of the circumstances were en-
couraged to write letters to the IRS to protest against the denial of
tax deductions to other members. 1
54. Id. at 578-579.
55. Id. at 584.
56. Id. at 574.
57. Id. at 584.
58. Id. at 582.
59. Id. at 584.
60. Id. at 580.
61. Id. at 570-584.
[Vol. 11:1
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Thus, since the facts of the cases are substantially different, ULC I
continues to have favorable precedential value for mail-order min-
isters who seek to abuse our tax system.
In addition to problems presented by the first amendment, de-
tecting a mail-order ministry scheme is difficult. Section 508(c) of
the Code does not require churches to apply to the government for
recognition of their tax-exempt status.2 This means that such
churches do not have to file a tax exemption form with the IRS. 3
IV. THE SECTION 170 DEDUCTION METHOD
A. Background
The creation of mail-order ministries under section 170 has
been attacked by the IRS and the courts." These challenges have
specifically focused on denying the mail-order minister's section
170 deduction. 5
The history of the charitable contribution deduction under
section 170 began when the deduction was proposed during consid-
eration of the Revenue Act of 1913.6 Supporters of the deduction
claimed that "it is desirable that there should be no curtailment
imposed by this act upon the benevolent members of the com-
munity. '67 Although the deduction proposal was rejected, a chari-
table deduction was enacted in 1917, when the top marginal in-
come tax rate dramatically increased to help pay for the United
States' entry into World War 1.68 The deduction was explicitly pro-
62. I.R.C. § 508(c) (1988).
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.508-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1976). (The exemption ap-
plication is Form 1023 Rev. 3186).
64. See, Wedvik v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1458 (1987).
65. See, Harrison v. Commissioner, 805 F.2d 973 (11th Cir. 1986); Smith v.
Commissioner, 800 F.2d 930 (1986).
66. See 50 Cong. Rec. 1259 (1913).
67. 50 Cong. Rec. 1259 (1913) (statement of Rep. Rogers).
68. See 55 Cong. Rec. 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hollis). The Revenue
Act of 1917, ch. 63 § 1201(2), 20 Stat. 300, 330, permitted a deduction for:
contributions or gifts actually made within the year to corporations or
associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific or educational purposes, or . . .cruelty to children or animals,
no part of the net income of which inures to the individual, to an amount
not in excess of fifteen percentum of the taxpayer's taxable net income as
computed without the benefit of this paragraph. Such contributions or
gifts shall be allowable as deductions only if verified under rules and reg-
ulations prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.
19881
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moted as a method of decreasing the deterrent effect of higher in-
come tax rate on charitable contributions.6
The scope of section 170 has expanded since its adoption. For
example, the deduction was extended to corporations in 1953.70 In
addition, most of the complexities and refinements of the current
statute were added as anti-abuse measures by the Tax Reform Act
of 1969.71
Section 170(a) of the Code in part provides a deduction to
itemizing taxpayers for certain types of "charitable contribu-
tions.""2 The term "charitable contribution" is defined in pertinent
part as a "contribution or gift to or for the use of. . . [a] corpora-
tion, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation organized and
operated exclusively for . . . religious purposes. 7 3 In addition, no
part of the net earnings of one of the aforementioned entities may
inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or person.74 A
"qualifying" charitable entity can lose a tax exemption for at-
tempting to influence legislation. Also, a charitable entity cannot
participate in or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of
any candidate for public office. 78 A taxpayer's charitable contribu-
tion deduction is generally limited to an exemption equal to fifty
percent of adjusted gross income for total gifts of cash and/or
One legislator, who articulated the problem the deduction was aimed at solving,
stated:
Usually people contribute to charities and educational objects out of
their surplus. After they have done everything else they want to do, after
they have educated their children and traveled and spent their money on
everything they really want or think they want, then if they have some-
thing left over, they will contribute it to a college or to the Red Cross or
for some scientific purposes. Now, when war comes and we impose these
very heavy taxes on income, that will be the first place where the wealthy
men will be tempted to economize, namely, in donations to charity. They
will say, "charity begins at home."
55 Cong. Rec. 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hollis).
69. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 Mo. L.
REv. 85, 87 (1985).
70. Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 102(c), 49 Stat. 1014, 1016.
71. Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 101, 121, 201, 83 Stat. 487, 492, 536, 549 (repealed
1986).
72. I.R.C. § 170 (1988). The charitable contribution deduction for non-
itemizers was eliminated by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100
Stat. 2085 (codified as amemded at 26 U.S.C. 1-9602 (1986)).
73. I.R.C. § 170(c) (1988). See also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
74. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(C) (1988).
75. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (1988).
[Vol. 11:1
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short-term capital gain property; and thirty percent of adjusted
gross income for total gifts of long-term capital gain property.76
B. Defeating a Mail-Order Ministry Established Under the Sec-
tion 170 Deduction Method
Courts have adopted a method of preventing tax avoidance
which involves the determination of whether a taxpayer, including
a mail-order minister, has met the burden of proof for claiming a
charitable deduction.7 If the IRS disallows a charitable deduction
claim, the taxpayer bears the burden of demonstrating that he or
she is entitled to the deduction.78
A mail-order minister must meet several tests to satisfy the
burden of proof. First, under seetion 170(c)(2)(C) of the Code, the
charitable deduction must be claimed for the same taxable year in
which the property is transferred. 79 In Stephenson v. Commis-
sioner,80 the petitioner received ministers' credentials and a church
charter through the mail from the Life Science Church around
February or early March of 1977. After receiving the church char-
ter, the petitioner established the "Life Science Church of Alle-
gan" and opened a bank account in the name of the church.8 1 Sub-
sequently, the petitioner deposited most of his earnings in the
account of Life Science Church of Allegan. 2 In July of 1977, the
petitioner and his wife placed the proceeds of the sale of their
house into the church account.83
The petitioner never obtained a tax exemption for contribu-
tions to the Life Science Church of Allegan under section
76. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i) (1988). A deduction for a contribution is generally
limited to fifty percent of adjusted gross income if made to a section
170(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iv) organization. Presumably, mail order ministries would claim
"church" status under section 170(b)(1)(A)(i). Taxpayers have an option with
long-term capital gain property to deduct up to fifty percent adjusted gross in-
come limit which is afforded cash and short-term capital gain property. I.R.C. §
170(b)(1)(C)(iii) (1988). To receive such a deduction, the taxpayer must reduce
the amount of the gift by forty percent of the appreciation which has occurred on
it. Id.
77. E.g., Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
78. Id.
79. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (1988); Abney v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 965
(1980).
80. 79 T.C. 995 (1983).
81. Id. at 998.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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501(c)(3). 4 On his 1976 tax return, the petitioner claimed charita-
ble contribution deductions under section 170 for contributions to
the church.8 5
In Stephenson, the Tax Court stated that section 170(a) al-
lows a deduction for charitable contributions only if the payment
is made during a time when a church is in existence.86 The court
determined that Mr. Stephenson never contributed any money or
other property to the Life Science Church or the Life Science
Church of Allegan in 1976 because the checks written to the
churches were actually written in February or early March, 1977.87
The checks issued by the petitioner were back-dated to December
30, 1976. For example, on the back of one check that was sent to a
member of the Life Science Church as a contribution, a bank
stamped the date of deposit as February 26, 1977.88 The Tax court
also determined that other checks which were back-dated to De-
cember 30, 1976 were written in February or March, 1977.89 The
petitioner failed to show that he created a church or contributed
money into the name of either the Life Science Church or the Life
Science Church of Allegan in 1976.90
To obtain a charitable deduction under section 170, a mail-
order minister must also prove that he or she has relinquished do-
minion and control over the property that was allegedly donated to
his or her religious organization." In Davis v. Commissioner,92 pe-
titioners, James J. Davis and Peggy Davis, husband and wife, at-
tempted to claim charitable deductions for contributions to the
ULC. Mrs. Davis obtained an honorary Doctor of Divinity "de-
gree" and a Doctor of Universal Life "degree" from the ULC 3
The petitioners also obtained a charter from the ULC which cre-
ated their own chapter of the church.9 4 Subsequently, Mrs. Davis
became the sole signatory over two checking accounts that were
opened in the name of the Universal Life Church and not the ULC
84. Id. at 999.
85. Id. at 1002.
86. Id. at 999.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. E.g., Davis v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 806, 817 (1983).
92. Id. at 806.
93. Id. at 808-809.
94. Id. at 808.
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(which as mentioned above, stands for "Universal Life Church,
Inc."). 5 The petitioners later bought a condominium in Florida
and paid part of their mortgage payments along with other per-
sonal expenses with checks drawn from the Universal Life Church
accounts."6
The Tax Court first noted that deductions are a matter of leg-
islative grace and that taxpayers must meet specific requirements
for the deductions they claim. The court subsequently held that
no charitable deductions could be taken because Mrs. Davis failed
to relinquish dominion and control over her Universal Life Church
checking accounts."' The Tax Court stated that the term "charita-
ble contribution" as it is employed in section 170, is largely synon-
ymous with the word "gift."99 The Davis court stated that a gift is
generally defined as "a voluntary transfer of property to another
without consideration. 10 The court concluded that since the peti-
tioners retained control over the checking accounts, no gift was
made. 10 1 Undoubtedly, the Tax Court ruled that since Mrs. Davis
was the sole signatory over a checking account in the name of an
entity which only the petitioners were members, no "transfer" was
ever made. Therefore, the court found that dominion and control
was never relinquished.
A taxpayer must also have a charitable motive to contribute
property before he or she can claim a charitable deduction.0 2 In
Phil Poldrugovaz and Madeline Poldrugovaz,103 the petitioners,
Phil and Madeline Poldrugovaz, husband and wife, each received a
"certification of ordination" and a church "charter" from the Free-
dom Church of Revelation ("FCR"). The FCR required all individ-
uals who wished to become ministers, to give a "donation" of ten
95. Id. at 809. See also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
96. Id. at 810-811.
97. Id. at 815. See also Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); New Colo-
nial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
98. Id. at 817.
99. Id. at 817. See also Seed v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 265, 275 (1971); De
Jong v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 896, 899 (1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 373, 376-379 (9th
Cir. 1962).
100. Davis, 81 T.C. at 817.
101. Id. In addition, Kirby Hensly testified in an attempt to establish that
the contributions had been made to ULC Modesto. The Court did not find his
evidence credible. Thus, the deduction was denied.
102. E.g., People v. Life Science Church, 450 N.Y.S. 2d 664, 113 Misc. 2d 952
(1982).
103. 47 T.C.M. (C.C.H.) 860 (1989).
19881
15
Scialabba et al.: Mail-Order Ministries under the Section 170 Charitable Contributi
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1988
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
percent of the individual's prior years' gross income."' The peti-
tioners delivered a check to FCR in the amount of $3,500.105 This
"donation" represented approximately ten percent of the petition-
ers' prior year's gross income.' °6 The Poldrugovaz's transfer of
$3,500 to the FCR was made in consideration for the petitioners'
certificates of ordination and charter and the right to attend semi-
nars taught by Freedom College, an institution affiliated with the
church.10 7 The petitioners attended many of these seminars where
they learned how to reduce their tax obligations by becoming min-
isters, establishing their own church, and deducting contributions.
These contributions would eventually be used for personal ex-
penses. 08 Finally, during the tax year at issue, the petitioners
made a charitable contribution totaling one hundred dollars to in-
stitutions not associated with FCR. The greatest single contribu-
tion to those institutions amounted to ten dollars.'0 9
The Tax Court held that although the petitioners transferred
$3,500 to the FCR in the tax year at issue, they did not evidence
that this transfer constituted a charitable contribution. 10 The
court, resting upon their position espoused in Davis, held that a
"charitable contribution" is largely synonymous with the word
"gift.""' However, the Poldrugovaz court added that if a payment
is made for an expectation of more than the satisfaction of giving,
such a payment is not a gift."2
104. Id. at 862.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 865.
111. Id. See also Davis v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 806 (1983).
112. Id. See De Jong v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. at 899. See also People v. Life
Science Church, 450 N.Y.S. 2d 664, 113 Misc. 2d 952 (1982) ("If the benefits that
the transferor can reasonably expect to obtain by making the transfer are suffi-
ciently substantiated to provide a 'quid pro quo,' no deduction under section 170
is allowed").
In Stubbs v. U.S., 428 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1009 (1971), the taxpayers entered into a contract to buy land. The contract was
contingent on whether the buyers could obtain rezoning to allow the use of a
trailer court and shopping center. Id. at 885. To insure access to the portion of
the land intended for the mobile home development, the plat provided for the
"donation" of a strip of property as a public road. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated:
The inquiry [into the motive behind the alleged charitable transfer]
serves to expose the true nature of the transaction: that ... the "gift"
[Vol. 11:1
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This rule is supported by two policy considerations. First, a
gift is different than an exchange because it is made out of a de-
tached generosity without the thought of receiving something in
return."' Second, the rule deters a "gift" which inures to the bene-
fit of the donor because the law is aimed at preventing individuals
from making transfers with merely an inurement incentive."" Fi-
nally, the court stated that the determination of a taxpayer's true
incentive to make a transfer involved a factual inquiry." 5
Applying the above principles to the facts of the case, the Pol-
drugovaz court decided that the petitioners failed to demonstrate
that the $3,500 they transferred to the FCR qualified as a charita-
ble contribution." 6 The court based its holding on its belief that
the petitioners' transfer was made principally in expectation of
specific economic benefits which would not otherwise had been
available to them. 17
In reaching its conclusion, the Tax Court focused on two facts.
First, the petitioners knew that in return for their transfer they
would receive a significant tax deduction." 8 For example, the court
stated that the petitioners attended seminars where they were in-
structed on how to reduce their tax burden by establishing a min-
istry." 9 Second, the Poldrugovaz court noted that the petitioners
made no other single contribution in excess of ten dollars to any
other charitable institution during the tax year at issue.2 0 A chari-
table motive is implied if the petitioners made no other transfers
in amounts similar to the one that they were claiming as a deduc-
• . . was in expectation of the receipt of certain specified direct economic
benefits within the power of the recipient to bestow directly or indirectly,
which otherwise might not be forthcoming.
Id. at 887. Thus, the court, in denying the taxpayers' claimed charitable deduc-
tion, stated that purpose of the transfer was to benefit the favorable zoning which
would guarantee public access to the mobile home development. Id. See also
Burwell v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. No. 41 (1987).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 47 T.C.M. at 865 (1974).
116. Id. at 865-866.
117. Id. at 865. (The court also found that no deduction should be allowed
for certain property transferred to the local "chapter").
118. Id.
119. Id. (The Poldrugovaz court noted that these seminars instructed the pe-
titioners on how they could use their ministry to, inter alia, decrease tax obliga-
tions by approximately seventy percent to one hundred percent after the ordina-
tion of the petitioners).
120. Id.
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tion.'2" When a person's motive for transferring is determined by
considering the amount of other transfers that the individual made
within the same tax year, the determination is based on the indi-
vidual's habit. In Poldrugovaz, it is reasonable to assume that the
petitioners were in the habit of making charitable donations of ten
dollars or less per contribution. Since the $3,500 transfer was so
large in comparison to the other transfers, some evidence existed
that the transfer at issue was made for other than charitable
purposes.
In order to obtain a charitable deduction, a mail-order minis-
ter must also evidence that no part of the net earnings of the reli-
gious or charitable institution inure to the benefit of any private
shareholder/individual. 22 The courts and the IRS have exper-
ienced much success in using the inurement restriction to deny the
claims of mail-order ministers for charitable contribution deduc-
tions.12 3 The inurement prohibition has been successful because it
does not require inquiry into the sincerity of the claimant's reli-
gious beliefs.
In Page v. Commissioner,124 the petitioners, Douglas and
Carolyn Page, husband and wife, sought to deduct transfers of
money to Chapter 8035, a subsidiary of the Basic Bible Church of
America ("Chapter 8035").125 The petitioners completed pre-
printed forms from the Basic Bible Church of America ("BBC").
The BBC provided bylaws and charter for Chapter 8035, certifi-
cates of ordination for the petitioners, statements about the status
of Mr. and Mrs. Page as ministers, and a vow of poverty. 2 ' The
bylaws of Chapter 8035 stated in relevant part that: Mr. Page
would be "head of the Chapter" for life; Mr. Page would have sole
authority over the church; nonvoting trustees would be named by
the Head of the Chapter; the trustees, which included Mr. Page's
wife, would hold in trust all real and personal property of the
chapter; and Mr. Page would have sole authority to control and
disburse the church's funds and property for his family's and
121. Id.
122. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(C) (1988); See, e.g., McGahen v. Commissioner, 79
T.C. 468 (1981).
123. See infra notes 124-140 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Page v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (C.C.H.) 1351. (1986), aff'd,
823 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1987).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1353.
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members' support.1 27
Mr. and Mrs. Page converted a portion of their home into a
chapel during the tax years at issue.11s The resulting structure con-
tained two pews, a few chairs, and a pool table.'29 The Page's used
a church checking account to pay family bills. 30 The petitioners
claimed charitable contribution deductions on earnings they trans-
ferred into the church checking account.' 3' The Tax Court denied
the petitioners' claimed deductions. 32
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Tax Court's
decision because the Page's failed to demonstrate that the church's
net earnings did not inure to their benefit. 3 ' Specifically, the ap-
pellate court held that Mr. Page retained and exercised control
over all the property and money in the church account for personal
living expenses.3
The court of appeals stated that it was not questioning
whether Chapter 8035 was a church or whether the members' prac-
tices constituted a religion. 3 5 Thus, the inurement proscription
has proved to be a strong and successful tactic for denying charita-
ble deduction claims of mail-order ministers because its use does
not violate the establishment or free exercise clauses of the first
amendment.
The strength of the inurement provision to withstand consti-
tutional scrutiny was also evidenced in McGahen v. Commis-
sioner.136 In this case Carl V. McGahen, the petitioner, was or-
dained a minister, received a doctor of divinity degree, and was
chartered as a subsidiary of the BBC.137 Before and after Mr.
McGahen's ordination, the petitioner worked as a boilermaker-
welder for various corporations. 3 Moreover, after petitioner's or-
dination, he was instructed by an archbishop of the BBC to con-
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1354.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1355.
132. Id. at 1356-1357.
133. 823 F.2d at 1273 (1987).
134. Id. at 1272.
135. Id. at 1269.
136. 76 T.C. 468 (1981). (This article discusses the charitable deduction issue.
However, in McGahen, the primary focus of the case is whether the petitioner
successfully assigned his income to the church for the years in question).
137. Id. at 470.
138. Id. at 473.
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tinue his occupation as a boilermaker-welder. 13 9 The bylaws of the
BBC subsidiary stated in pertinent part that: one, the petitioner
held title to all real and personal property of the subsidiary; and
two, the petitioner had sole power to control and dispense with the
subsidiary's funds and property for his support. 40 The petitioner
put all of his earnings into a checking account in the subsidiary
church of the BBC."" During the tax years in issue, Mr. McGahen
used the checking account to support his children, to pay mortgage
installments on his house, his union dues, certain taxes, repair
bills, gasoline, and insurance payments for his automobiles. 4 ' The
petitioner claimed charitable contribution deductions for the tax
year earnings he transferred into the checking account for the BBC
subsidiary. 14 3
The Tax Court denied Mr. McGahen's claimed charitable de-
ductions in part because the court held that the petitioner received
prohibited inurement.' 4 The court considered three facts in mak-
ing its decision: first, the fact that the bylaws stated that the peti-
tioner was to hold title to all real and personal property of the
BBC subsidiary; second, the fact that the bylaws provided that Mr.
McGahen had sole power to control and disperse the chapter's
funds; and third, the fact that the petitioner used such funds in
the subsidiary's checking account to pay for his personal and living
expenses." 5 In addition, the Tax Court noted that when circum-
stances exist in which a single individual controls the use of a
church's funds for his own and his family's support, close scrutiny
is required to determine if there has been a violation of the pro-
scribed inurement provision of section 170(c)(2).""
The last requirement a mail-order minister must meet in order
to claim a charitable deduction is, as mentioned above, that he or
she must prove that the organization receiving the gift is organized
139. Id.
140. Id. at 471-72 n. 3. (The McGahen court stated the bylaws set forth that
the head of the BBC subsidiary held title to all real and personal property of such
subsidiary). Id. at 482. With regard to this issue, the court noted that the peti-
tioner who was ordained and established as "church personally" was head of the
subsidiary. Id.
141. Id. at 473.
142. Id. at 474.
143. Id. at 470 and 473.
144. Id. at 482-483.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 482.
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and operated exclusively for religious purposes as required by sec-
tion 170(c)(2)(A)." 7 An organization is exempt from tax under sec-
tion 501(c)(3) if it is organized and operated exclusively for, among
other things, religious purposes. 14' As previously mentioned, the
requirements of sections 170(c)(2)(A) and 501(c)(3) parallel each
other." Therefore, the law that has developed to administer the
religious purpose exemption under section 501(c)(3) can be used to
determine whether contributions to a church are deductible under
section 170(a).150
An institution is organized "exclusively" for a religious pur-
pose if it is organized primarily for a religious purpose or such a
purpose and other exempt purpose[s] under section 501(c)(3).' 5 ' A
church will not qualify for tax-exempt status if a substantial part
of its activities are not in furtherance of a religious purpose.1
52
Moreover, if there exists a single substantial nonexempt purpose,
the exemption will be destroyed regardless of the number of truly
exempt purposes.153
The "organized exclusively" requirement has been used suc-
cessfully to defeat mail-order ministry schemes. In Stephenson v.
Commissioner,15 4 the church charter provided for the assets of the
ministry to be returned to the donor upon dissolution of the organ-
ization if there was a disagreement among the board of trustees as
how to dispose of the assets. 55 In this case, as previously men-
tioned, the church's founder, his wife and another individual, were
the sole trustees of a subsidiary of the Life Science Church. Mr.
Stephenson executed a vow of poverty and transferred all the fam-
ily assets to the subsidiary. 5 The minister and his wife were the
only donors to the church.' 57 Most of the contributions received by
147. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (1988). (See supra note 32 and accompanying
text).
148. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988). (See supra note 33 and accompanying text).
149. See Canada v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 982, 980, note 35 (1984); See Cal-
vin K. of Oakknoll v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 770 (1978), aff'd by order 603 F.2d
211 (2nd Cir. 1979).
150. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1976); supra note 9 at
919.
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(1)(i)(b) (1954).
152. Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).
153. Church in Boston v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 102 (1978).
154. 79 T.C. 995 (1983).
155. Id. at 1002.
156. Id. at 999.
157. Id. at 1000.
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the church were spent on the couple's mortgage and homeowners
insurance. 158 The Tax Court denied the minister's charitable con-
tribution deduction partly because the founder was one of the
trustees.159 The founder could insure that the assets of the subsidi-
ary would be returned to him on dissolution. The court ruled that
the minister's control over the final disposition of the church's as-
sets substantiated that it was not organized exclusively for an ex-
empt purpose.16 0
Hansen v. Commissioner"" also evidences the denial of a min-
ister's charitable contribution deduction because the church failed
the exclusive organization requirement. In this case, the founder of
the Church of Man, John Hansen, never performed religious cere-
monies.162 The organization had little or no formal religious ser-
vices.16 3 There were no large donations to the ministry other than
those made by the founder and his wife.' Moreover, the minister,
as chairman of the church's governing body, caused the ministry to
make a $300,000 award to his wife for her devotion in furthering
the goals of the Church of Man.6 5
The Tax Court, in Hansen, determined that the lack of reli-
gious services and the payment to the founder's wife, were nonex-
empt activities which were more than incidental to the church.1 6
Accordingly, the court of appeals upheld the Tax Court's denial of
the founder's charitable deduction because the Church of Man was
not organized exclusively for religious purposes.17
As mentioned above, under sections 170(c)(2)(A) and
501(c)(3), a mail-order minister must not only meet the exclusive
organization test but must also meet the "operated exclusively" re-
quirement. 6 ' An organization is operated exclusively for a religious
purpose if its activities primarily serve a religious purpose or such
purpose and other exempt purpose[s] under section 501(c)(3)."s9
158. Id. at 998.
159. Id. at 1002.
160. Id.
161. 820 F.2d 1464 (1987).
162. Id. at 1466.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1468.
167. Id. See Pusch v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 838 (1980).
168. See supra notes 147-151 and accompanying text.
169. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1976).
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The purpose of an activity, rather than the nature of the activity
itself, is determinative of whether the institution satisfies the oper-
ational test. 70 A church is not operated exclusively for religious
purposes unless it is operated for the benefit of the public rather
than for the benefit of a private interest."'
Like the exclusive organization requirement, the exclusive op-
eration test has been used successfully to defeat mail-order minis-
try schemes. For example, in Church in Boston v. Commissioner,'
72
a substantial portion of the church's funds were allocated to make
grants to private individuals. Although the church argued that the
grants were to give the poor financial assistance, the religious insti-
tution did not provide any evidence with regard to how the selec-
tion process was made.'73 The Tax Court decided that these pay-
ments did not directly serve a religious purpose and were
nonexempt activities.174 Accordingly, the court denied the church's
exemption because the institution was held to not be operated "ex-
clusively" for a religious purpose.1
75
Basic Bible Church v. Commissioner176 is another example of
the destruction of a church's exemption because it failed the exclu-
sive operation requirement. In this case, the church's founder and
his wife executed vows of poverty and transferred all of their per-
sonal assets to the organization on the condition that it qualified
for a tax exemption. 77 The founder and his wife were the primary
donors to the church. 78 Almost all of the donations recieved by the
organization were spent on the founder and his wife for clothing,
food, travel, and maintenance of their home. 9 The founder, who
made all the financial decisions of the church, allocated less than
one percent of the organization's contributions to church related
expenses. 8 0 The Tax Court denied the religious institution's tax
exemption and ruled that the church's nonexempt activities com-
170. Bethel Mennonite Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 352, 360 (1983),
rev'd 84-2 USTC 9870 (7th Cir. 1984).
171. See Church of the Transfiguring Spirit v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1, 5
(1981); see also Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
172. 71 T.C. 102 (1978).
173. Id. at 106.
174. Id. at 107.
175. Id.
176. 74 T.C. 846 (1980); aff'd, 739 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1984).
177. Id. at 850-851.
178. Id. at 857.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 850, 857-58.
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prised more than a substantial part of the organization's total
activities.'81
Ecclesiastical Order of Ism of Am v. Commissioner1 82 is an-
other example which demonstrates that a church's tax exemption
can be denied if it fails the exclusive operation requirement. In
this case, the petitioner was comprised of a home office and ap-
proximately twenty-six chartered orders."' 3 The petitioner con-
ducted an active recruiting campaign for church members by em-
phasizing the tax benefits of becoming a minister in a church
called the "Ism of Am.' 18 The materials given to potential mem-
bers indicated the emphasis the church placed on tax benefits to
its ministers. 85 Individuals who were interested in becoming min-
isters in the petitioner's church were often taught about the tax
benefits available.' In addition, the prospective ministers recevied
written instructions on how to avoid paying taxes through estab-
lishing tax-exempt chartered orders of the church.'87
The Tax Court found that the petitioner had a substantial
nonexempt purpose which consisted of counselling individuals on
the purported tax benefits available to ministers of the Ism of
Am. "'88 The court denied the petitioner's tax exemption because
the organization was not operated exclusively for religious
purposes.'89
C. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 ("TRA '86") will have an adverse
impact on mail-order ministries. The "TRA '86" changed tax rates,
charitable contribution deductions, and tax penalties which will
decrease the number of mail-order ministries.
TRA '86 reduces the tax advantage of using the section 170
deduction method. In 1986, the maximum tax rate was fifty per-
cent.190 In 1987, under TRA '86, it was roughly thirty-four percent.
181. Id. at 857-858.
182. 80 T.C. 833 (1983).
183. Id. at 834.
184. Id. at 834-5.
185. Id. at 835.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 836.
188. 80 T.C. at 839.
189. Id.
190. I.R.C. § 1(c)(3) (1954).
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In 1988 and 1989, the tax rate is generally twenty-eight percent.191
Section 170 creates an itemized deduction.1 92 An itemized deduc-
tion is a deduction from adjusted gross income. 9 ' A tax rate is ap-
plied to an amount of adjusted gross income resulting in an
amount of tax due. A deduction from adjusted gross income de-
creases the amount of adjusted gross income which is subject to
tax. Therefore, a deduction from adjusted gross income reduces tax
less than the same deduction when a higher tax rate is used. Thus,
the tax rate reduction under TRA '86 means that charitable deduc-
tions will provide less tax savings. Therefore, the incentive to claim
section a 170 deduction for mail-order ministers is reduced.
TRA '86 has also provided new tax penalties which should
cause a decrease in the number of mail-order ministry schemes.
The act increases the penalty for a substantial understatement of
tax liability under section 6661 of the Code from ten percent to
twenty-five percent of the amount of the underpayment of tax at-
tributable to the understatement.19 4
TRA '86 also makes the negligence penalty under section
6653(a) of the Code applicable to all taxes.195 The act also broad-
ens the definition of negligence to include any failure to make a
reasonable attempt to comply with the rules.' 96
Furthermore, TRA '86 increases the fraud penalty under sec-
tion 6653(b) of the Code from fifty percent to seventy-five per-
cent.1 97 However, the fraud penalty will apply only to the portion
191. I.R.C. §§ 1(a)-(e), (h) (1986). TRA '86 sets forth two tax rates for indi-
vidual taxpayers: a 15% rate and a 28% rate. See I.R.C. §§ 1(a)-(d). The Code
phases out the benefit of the 15% rate for taxpayers whose income exceeds cer-
tain levels. I.R.C. § 1(g) (as amended by Section 1001(a)(3) of the Technical and
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, "TAMRA"). These provisions in effect pro-
vide a third tax rate of 33% for these taxpayers on a part of their taxable income.
This is set forth by means of an additional tax of 5% on taxable income that
reaches certain levels. Id.
192. I.R.C. § 170 (1988).
193. See I.R.C. § 63(b)(1)(A) (1988).
194. I.R.C. § 6661 (as repealed by Section 101(c) of the Technical and Mis-
cellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, and amended by Pub. L. No. 99-509, section
8002(a) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 ("OBRA' 86").
195. I.R.C. § 6653(a) (as amended by Section 1015(b)(2)(A), and (B) of
TAMRA).
196. I.R.C. § 6653(a)(3) (as amended by Section 1015(b)(2)(A), and (B) of
TAMRA).
197. I.R.C. § 6653(b) (as amended by Section 1015(b)(2)(A), and (B) of
TAMRA).
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of the underpayment attributable to the fraud."8" If the IRS proves
that any portion of the underpayment is attributable to fraud, the
taxpayer must prove which portion of the underpayment is not at-
tributable to fraud or the entire underpayment will be treated as a
fraud penalty. 99
Finally, once the IRS notifies the taxpayer that it intends to
levy upon the taxpayer's assets, 00 the penalty for failure to pay
taxes under section 6651(d) of the Code increases from one half
percent to one percent per month. In addition, the court of appeals
can assess damages against mail-order ministers and their attor-
neys for filing a frivolous appeal. 01 These penalty changes will
have a strong deterrent effect on a mail-order minister. One or
more of these penalties may apply to a mail-order minister who
has his or her section 170 charitable contribution deduction de-
nied. The increase and broadening of penalties by Congress will
provide the courts and the IRS with greater power to punish these
tax protesters. The prospect of maintaining a mail-order ministry
will become less cost-effective. Therefore, mail-order ministers will
be less likely to accept the risk of being subjected to more of these
penalties. This will cause the number of mail-order ministry
schemes to decline.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The above discussion has demonstrated that the free exercise
and establishment clauses of the Constitution provide restrictions
on the courts and the government in their effort to prevent the
proliferation of mail-order ministries. However, a minister cannot
always use these constraints in order to have his or her charitable
contribution deduction upheld. A mail-order minister must prove
the following requirements in order to claim a section 170
deduction:
1. the charitable deduction was made for the same tax year in
which the property is transferred;
198. I.R.C. § 6653(b)(1)(A) (as amended by Section 1015(b)(2)(A), and (B) of
TAMRA).
199. I.R.C. § 6653(b)(2) (as amended by Section 1015(b)(2)(A), and (B) of
TAMRA).
200. I.R.C. § 6651(d) (1988).
201. I.R.C. § 7482(c)(4); 28 U.S.C. § 1927; FED. R. App. P. 38; see e.g. Kalgard
v. C.I.R., 746 F.2d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985); Smith v. C.I.R., 800 F.2d 930 (9th
Cir. 1986).
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MAIL-ORDER MINISTRIES
2. there has been a relinquishment of dominion and control
over the property that was donated;
3. the property was transferred because of a charitable motive;
4. no part of the net earnings of the religious or charitable or-
ganization has inured to the benefit of any private shareholder/in-
dividual; and
5. the donee religious organization was organized and operated
exclusively for religious purposes.
The inurement requirement is the best weapon in the arsenal
for preventing the proliferation of mail-order ministries. This is
because the proscription does not require a determination with re-
spect to the sincerity of one's religious belief. In addition, every
mail-order ministry situation involves the establishment of a
church for the private benefit of its members and their families.
Therefore, the inurement challenge may be used whenever a mail-
order ministry exists. Finally, the law that has developed to thwart
the claims of mail-order ministers is strengthened because of the
impact of TRA '86.
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